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In 1986, Congress enacted the Air Carriers Access Act
("ACAA" or "the Act") in an effort to prohibit commercial air car-
riers from discriminating against the nearly five million disabled
Americans who require access to air transportation annually.' The
main provision of the ACAA reads as follows: "No air carrier may
discriminate against any otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air transporta-
tion."2 The Act defines a "qualified handicapped individual" as
one who purchases a ticket, presents herself or himself for travel,
t B.A. 1989, The University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1993, The University of
Chicago.
I Air Carriers Access Act of 1986, 49 USC § 13 7 4(c) (1988). For the number of Ameri-
cans who require access to air transportation, see 132 Cong Rec S 9901 (Jul 30, 1986) (state-
ment of Senator Chafee). Congress enacted the Act in an effort to overturn the Supreme
Court's decision in Department of Transportation v Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477
US 597 (1986) (permitting commercial air carriers that do not receive federal funds to dis-
criminate against the disabled in the provision of air transportation). See 132 Cong Rec S
9899 (Jul 30, 1986) (statement of Senator Dole). For general information regarding the
ACAA and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, see David B. Helfrey and Russell
W. Piraino, Equal Access to Air Transportation-The Only Way to Fly, 8 L & Inequality
469 (1990); George S. Petkoff, Recent Cases and Developments in Aviation Law, Part 11, 56
J Air L & Comm 491 (1990); Comment, The Struggle For Equal Access Includes Commer-
cial Air Transportation, 30 Santa Clara L Rev 1007 (1990); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The
Civil Rights of the Handicapped in Transportation, 19 Transp L J 309 (1991).
2 49 USC § 1374(c)(1).
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and meets reasonable contract requirements expected of all
passengers.3
Whether the Act has improved the quality or availability of air
transportation for disabled persons remains uncertain.4 But as one
commentator observed, "[i]f you are a wheelchair user and travel
even occasionally by air, it's a safe bet that you have had trouble
on just about every flight you have ever taken."5 One commentator
has suggested that the Act has not achieved its goals, in part be-
cause of minimal public enforcement by the Department of Trans-
portation ("DOT"), the agency charged with enforcing the Act.'
Current DOT regulations require carriers to post officials at
each airport they serve to receive and resolve complaints regarding
ACAA violations. If an airline does not satisfactorily resolve a
complaint, the DOT may assess a fine not to exceed ten thousand
dollars." However, these regulations and fines fall short of accom-
plishing the ACAA's goals.
Beginning in 1988, private parties began bringing civil actions
against commercigl air carriers in an effort to force the carriers to
comply with the Act's prohibition against discrimination.9 How-
ever, the ACAA does not contain any provision that explicitly pro-
vides for or denies private enforcement actions.10 This Comment
addresses two questions: whether courts may imply a private cause
of action under the Act and, if so, whether they may award dam-
ages for emotional distress and punitive damages.
Of the three cases that have raised the question of an implied
private cause of action and available damages,"L two reached the
appellate level: one in the Fifth Circuit 12 and one in the Eighth
Circuit.1 3 The third awaits appeal in the Tenth Circuit.14 In each
3 14 CFR § 382.5 (1992).
1 See David M. Capozzi, The Disabled Fly in Unfriendly Skies, 71 Bus & Soc Rev 22,
26 (Fall 1989).
5 Id at 22.
' Comment, 30 Santa Clara L Rev at 1033 (cited in note 1).
7 14 CFR § 382.65 (1992).
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 USC § 1471(a)(1) (1988).
As suggested in Capozzi, 71 Bus & Soc Rev at 22, 26, because the government failed
to issue regulations to accompany the ACAA on time, plaintiffs began to bring lawsuits in
hopes of improving conditions.
10 See 49 USC § 1374(c).
'2 See Americans Disabled for Accessible Public Transp. (ADAPT) v Skywest Airlines,
Inc., 762 F Supp 320 (D Utah 1991); Shinault v American Airlines, Inc., 936 F2d 796 (5th
Cir 1991); Tallarico v Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F2d 566 (8th Cir 1989).
12 Shinault, 936 F2d 796.
Tallarico, 881 F2d 566.
1, ADAPT, 762 F Supp 320.
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case, the respective court implied a private cause of action under
the Act.15 Each appellate court granted compensatory damages, in-
cluding damages for emotional distress, but failed to reach the is-
sue of the availability of punitive damages." In contrast, the dis-
trict court in the third case, though it assumed that a private cause
of action existed, held that neither damages for emotional distress
nor punitive damages were available under the Act.' 7
These three cases raise several issues that merit analysis. To
begin, the appellate courts' failure to reach the issue of punitive
damages leaves open the question whether punitive damages are
available under the Act. The conflict between the appellate courts
and the district court on the issue of damages for emotional dis-
tress also raises the question whether such damages are available
under the Act. In addition, an analysis of the appellate courts' rea-
soning" raises the question whether the courts were correct to im-
ply a private cause of action.
To analyze these issues, one naturally looks to cases that have
implied private causes of action under other federal statutes. The
Supreme Court has created two distinct tests to guide lower courts
in this endeavor. 9 In 1975, for example, the Court established a
four-pronged test in Cort v Ash.20 The two appellate courts that
have construed the ACAA based their decisions to imply a private
cause of action on the Cort test.2 Although use of the Cort test
may be appropriate in some cases, it should not be used to inter-
pret the ACAA. Because the Cort test requires a less rigorous in-
vestigation into legislative intent, courts should use the test estab-
lished in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v Lewis22 to
interpret the ACAA. Thus, it is important to examine the ACAA in
light of the more stringent Transamerica test to determine
whether implication of a private cause of action is warranted.23
1" Shinault, 936 F2d at 800; Tallarico, 881 F2d at 570. In ADAPT, the court assumed
that a private cause of action existed. The point was never explicitly contested or addressed,
although the issue of damages in response to a private cause of action was discussed. See
ADAPT, 762 F Supp at 326-27.
'" Shinault, 936 F2d at 804; Tallarico, 881 F2d at 572.
17 ADAPT, 762 F Supp at 327.
18 Because the district court in ADAPT assumed that a private cause of action existed,
its reasoning cannot be analyzed. See note 15.
19 See, for example, Texas & Pacific Ry. v Rigsby, 241 US 33 (1916); Cort v Ash, 422
US 66 (1975); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v Lewis, 444 US 11 (1979).
20 422 US at 78.
11 Shinault, 936 F2d at 800; Tallarico, 881 F2d at 568-70.
22 444 US 11.
1, See notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
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These implication cases also pose a larger question concerning
methods of interpretation. Plaintiffs in implication cases ask courts
to imply private causes of action and corresponding damages under
federal statutes containing no explicit direction on either issue. In
answering the question whether a private cause of action and dam-
ages are available under the ACAA, this Comment will demon-
strate the method of analysis that courts should use when con-
fronted with the same question under other federal statutes.
Section I briefly reviews the relevant case law concerning the
ACAA. Section II discusses two standards of interpretation and
one canon of construction that should govern analysis of implica-
tion issues within the context of the ACAA and statutes generally.
Section III uses the standards of interpretation and the same ca-
non of construction to determine whether a private cause of action
is available under the Act. Section IV inquires whether damages
for emotional distress and punitive damages are available, applying
both the proposed canon of construction and an alternative
method. The Comment concludes that private causes of action and
damages for emotional distress are available under the Act while
punitive damages are not.
I. RELEVANT CASE LAW
Private plaintiffs have brought civil actions to enforce the
ACAA on three separate occasions. This Section of the Comment
briefly describes the facts of each case to highlight the difficulties
people with disabilities2 4 face in air travel. It then discusses the
courts' reasoning concerning an implied private cause of action
under the Act. It concludes with a discussion of the courts' reason-
ing concerning the implication of damages for emotional distress
and punitive damages.
In Shinault v American Airlines, Inc.,2" the defendant airline
denied a man with quadriplegia access to one of its flights. The
Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the
air carrier in question had violated the Act by intentionally dis-
criminating against Shinault.26 Ironically, the airline's conduct
24 The terms and phrases used in this Comment to describe people with disabilities
were taken from Guidelines for Reporting and Writing About People With Disabilities,
(The Research & Training Center on Independent Living, 4th ed 1990).
26 936 F2d 796.
26 Id at 800. All parties agreed that the plaintiff qualified as an "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual" because he was accompanied by a nondisabled adult. Id. Note that
recent revisions to the regulations no longer require a nondisabled escort. See text accompa-
nying note 3.
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caused Shinault, a representative of the Easter Seals Foundation,
to miss a press conference intended to raise public awareness of
the obstacles and issues that people with disabilities face. The air-
line's actions and procedures for dealing with the disabled caused
Shinault to miss a connecting flight and forced him to wait in the
airport for five hours without his personal equipment. 7 Although
the airline supplied him with a wheelchair, Shinault feared that he
would suffer physical injuries without his personal wheelchair and
other needed equipment. 8
In Tallarico v Trans World Airlines, Inc.,29 the Eighth Circuit
held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant air-
line had intentionally discriminated against a thirteen-year-old
with cerebral palsy when it denied her access to one of its flights."
The plaintiff intended to fly from her school in Texas to her home
in St. Louis for the Thanksgiving holiday. Because the airline
agents would not allow the plaintiff to board the plane alone, her
father flew to Texas to accompany her home on a later flight. Fear-
ing similar treatment on the return trip, the plaintiff's father also
accompanied her on the return flight.
In the third case, ADAPT v Skywest Airlines, Inc.,31 the dis-
trict court granted partial summary adjudication to a defendant
airline that had denied a wheelchair user access to one of its
flights. The plaintiff, the Executive Director of the Salt Lake Citi-
zens' Congress, intended to fly from Salt Lake City to a speaking
engagement in Idaho.82 The airline refused to allow her to board
the plane without a nondisabled adult, even though she claimed to
be an otherwise qualified handicapped individual. The airline's re-
fusal caused the plaintiff to miss her engagement. In addition, the
airline refused to issue her a ticket for a future flight.
27 Id at 799.
28 Id. Because the wheelchair the airline provided was low-backed and had neither seat
belts nor other restraining devices, the plaintiff sat with his head propped up against a wall
in order to maintain his balance. Shinault v American Airlines, Inc., 738 F Supp 193, 196 (S
D Miss 1990). The plaintiff feared injuries from a fall from the wheelchair, pressure sores
from the wheelchair, and dysreflexia or stroke from an inability to perform his bowel pro-
gram. None of the injuries materialized.
29 881 F2d 566.
30 Id at 571. The court upheld the jury's finding that the plaintiff qualified as an "oth-
erwise qualified handicapped individual" under the Act. Id at 569, affirming the finding
reported in Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, 693 F Supp 785, 790 (E D Mo 1988).
S1 762 F Supp 320.
32 Id at 322.
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In the two appellate cases, the courts based their decisions to
imply a private cause of action on Cort v Ash,a3 which established
a four part test for determining whether Congress intended to per-
mit private enforcement under a federal statute. Under Cort, a
court must examine: (1) the class the statute benefits, (2) the legis-
lative history, (3) the statute's underlying purpose, and (4) the
subject matter of the claim. 4 After considering each of the four
prongs of the Cort test, the appellate courts in the ACAA cases
found that Congress intended to create a private cause of action
pursuant to the Act.3 5
To determine the availability of emotional distress damages,
the Eighth Circuit panel in Tallarico and the district court in
ADAPT drew analogies between the ACAA and other civil rights
statutes.3 " The ADAPT court reasoned that since an analogous
civil rights statute did not allow for the recovery of emotional dis-
tress damages, it was unlikely that Congress intended for the
ACAA to provide for the recovery of such damages.3 7 The Eighth
Circuit in Tallarico reached the opposite conclusion by drawing an
analogy between the ACAA and civil rights statutes that did pro-
vide for damages for emotional distress."' The Fifth Circuit in
Shinault, finding analogies unhelpful, relied on Guardians Assn. v
Civil Service Comm'n of New York City39 to conclude that in the
absence of contrary legislative intent courts should grant full relief,
including damages for emotional distress. 0 Finding no evidence of
33 Shinault, 936 F2d at 800; Tallarico, 881 F2d at 568-70.
' Cort, 422 US at 78. See also notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
35 Shinault, 936 F2d at 800; Tallarico, 881 F2d at 570.
36 Tallarico, 881 F2d at 570-71; ADAPT, 762 F Supp at 326-27.
' ADAPT, 762 F Supp at 327. The court compared the ACAA to § 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act. 29 USC § 794 (1988). The court also cited Tallarico, 693 F Supp at 790, Martin v
Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hasp. for Children, 599 F Supp 284 (E D Mo 1984), and
Marshburn v Postmaster General of the United States, 678 F Supp 1182, 1184-85 (D Md
1988), for the proposition that the Rehabilitation Act precludes the recovery of damages for
emotional distress. 762 F Supp at 325. At the appellate level, the Tallarico court found the
reasoning behind these cases unpersuasive. 881 F2d at 570. For cases that allow for the
recovery of damages for emotional distress see note 146.
38 881 F2d at 570-71. The court compared the ACAA to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
USC § 1982 (1988); the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 USC § 1983 (1988); and the Fair Hous-
ing Act, 42 USC § 3601 et seq (1988).
-9 463 US 582, 595-96 (1983). Although this is also a case construing a civil rights stat-
ute, the Fifth Circuit relied on a rule of interpretation set forth in the opinion rather than
on an analogy to the remedies the Court granted in the case.
,1 Shinault, 936 F2d at 804.
1188 [59:1183
Air Carriers Access Act
contrary legislative intent, the Shinault court held that Congress
intended to permit emotional distress damages under the ACAA.' 1
The Shinault and Tallarico courts did not reach the issue of
punitive damages because the plaintiffs had not alleged the type of
wanton and malicious behavior required to support such dam-
ages.42 The district court in ADAPT held that punitive damages
were not available under the ACAA as a matter of law.43 The
ADAPT court based this holding on an analogy between the ACAA
and another civil rights statute that did not permit recovery of
such damages."
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN IMPLICATION CASES
Before a court can decide a question arising under a particular
statute, it must determine the method of analysis it will use to in-
terpret the statute.45 Because the two most common signposts of
legislative intent, the statutory language and the legislative his-
tory,4 offer no explicit guidance to courts in implication cases, a
well-defined analytical framework is particularly necessary. By def-
inition, implication cases concern statutes that contain no explicit
provisions regarding private enforcement. Remarking on the si-
lence of the legislative history in such cases, the Supreme Court
wrote, "[w]e must recognize ... that the legislative history of a
statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy
will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question. 47
Thus, courts need extra analytical guidance when interpreting stat-
utes in implication cases. This Section sets forth two standards
and a canon of construction that courts should use to analyze im-
plication issues.
A. Standards For Implication Cases
A standard is a guide that directs a court's analysis of a spe-
cific question of law.48 For implication cases, the Supreme Court
has created two standards to guide lower courts in answering the
41 Id.
42 Id; Tallarico, 881 F2d at 572.
" ADAPT, 762 F Supp at 327.
" See notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
"I See James Willard Hurst, Dealing With Statutes 31-32 (Columbia, 1982); Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U Chi L Rev
800, 800-02 (1983).
4' Hurst, Dealing With Statutes at 56-57.
47 Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677, 694 (1979).
" See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 245 (Harvard, 1985).
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specific question whether the statute provides for private enforce-
ment. The first standard requires that courts analytically separate
two related questions: whether a private cause of action is availa-
ble, and whether damages are available.4 9 Because courts consider
similar evidence in deciding the two issues, separating the issues
ensures that courts grant damages based on the available evidence
and not simply on the contemporaneous decision to imply a pri-
vate cause of action.50
The second standard provides that the implication of a private
cause of action and damages depends on the intent of the legisla-
ture that enacted the statute. 1 Because Congress establishes statu-
tory rights and obligations, courts may imply a private cause of
action and damages only if they find that the enacting Congress
intended to provide for such relief.52 Where intent is not explicit,
courts can search for implicit indications of Congress's intent. The
question of how to determine the implicit intent of a federal stat-
ute can best be answered by reference to a general tool of statutory
construction-a canon, or rule of construction.
B. Canons of Construction for Implication Cases
Canons of construction are general rules that courts use to
guide statutory interpretation." This Section focuses on one canon
of construction, the "context canon," which courts should use to
interpret the ACAA and other federal statutes when deciding im-
plication issues.
1. Canons in general.
During the past four decades many legal scholars, including
Karl Llewellyn and Richard Posner, have viewed canons as illegiti-
mate creations of judges. 54 These critics have argued that canons
19 See Guardians Assn. v Civil Service Comm'n of New York, 463 US at 595 (1983),
quoting Davis v Passman, 442 US 228, 239 (1979) ("Whether a litigant has a cause of action
'is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be
entitled to receive.' ").
"0 See Davis, 442 US at 239-40 n 18.
51 See, for example, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v Lewis, 444 US 11, 15-16
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v Redington, 442 US 560, 568 (1979); Cannon, 441 US at 688;
Cort, 422 US at 68-69; Texas & Pacific Ry. v Rigsby, 241 US 33, 39 (1916).
52 See cases cited in note 51.
63 See Hurst, Dealing With Statutes at 56 (cited in note 45).
4 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand L Rev 395 (1950); Posner, 50
U Chi L Rev 800 (cited in note 45).
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are merely mechanical justifications for substantative decisions,"5
or that they are contrivances that falsely impute omniscience to
Congress.56 These scholars have suggested that courts should aban-
don canons and search for other methods of statutory interpreta-
tion. For example, Karl Llewellyn suggested that courts should
"strive to make sense as a whole out of our law as a whole. '57
Judge Posner offered an "attitude" or "slogan" suggesting that
"the task for the judge called upon to interpret a statute is best
described as one of imaginative reconstruction. The judge should
try to think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting
legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute
applied to the case at bar." 58
Although these criticisms merit reflection, it is important to
note that the Supreme Court has continued to rely on canons of
construction even in the face of this body of criticism. 9 While the
Supreme Court has never explicitly responded to the critics' argu-
ments, other legal scholars have offered convincing arguments to
support the Court's continued use of canons of construction. 0 One
scholar has argued that, even if contrived, interpretive norms or
canons of construction are inevitable in every area of modern law.
He asserts that the words of a statute simply "cannot be inter-
preted without some sort of understanding about the background
against which they are written. '61 Even a fairly straightforward ca-
non such as the one that requires courts to read the "plain mean-
ing" of statutory terms can only approximate the intent underlying
those terms.2
The argument supporting the use of canons is not meant to
suggest that all canons are legitimate under all circumstances.
Rather, it suggests that canons are not always illegitimate merely
because they contain some element of contrivance. Canons can
Llewellyn, 3 Vand L Rev at 399 (cited in note 54).
56 Posner, 50 U Chi L Rev at 811 (cited in note 45).
Llewellyn, 3 Vand L Rev at 399.
5 Posner, 50 U Chi L Rev at 817 (footnote omitted).
Id at 801; Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regula-
tory State 149-50 (Harvard, 1990). In addition, the Supreme Court cases referred to in this
Comment demonstrate the current Supreme Court's use of canons of construction. See, for
example, cases cited in note 64.
60 Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 150-57; William N. Eskridge and Philip P.
Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy
693-95 (West, 1988); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
Colum L Rev 527, 544-45 (1947).
41 Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 149.
62 Id at 152-53.
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serve as legitimate analytical tools for statutory interpretation
when legislative guidance is lacking. Canons offer the best availa-
ble approximation of legislative intent, especially when substantive
justifications support their use. When used appropriately, canons
limit the otherwise largely unlimited discretion that courts have in
interpreting statutes. As one commentator suggested, "[e]ven when
the traditional sources of interpretation leave gaps, courts should
not resolve cases merely by deciding what result would in their
view be best, all things considered. Instead, the legal culture
should be taken to impose a degree of constraint on the selection
of the governing principle."6 3 Canons of construction impose a de-
gree of constraint on the judiciary.
2. The context canon of construction.
One canon of construction the Supreme Court has used offers
guidance to courts faced with implication questions. This canon,
the "context canon," directs courts to consider the context of a
statute's enactment.64 The context comprises the set of legal norms
that were in effect at the time the legislature enacted the statute.6 5
Those legal norms might include specific Supreme Court deci-
sions," or even general principles commonly known to the legal
culture at the time. 7 Judges applying this "context canon" must
recreate the legal context in order to understand the words of the
statute in the same way the enacting Congress understood them.
In a recent case, Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak, 8 the
Supreme Court examined the context of a statute's enactment in
order to determine the intent of the enacting legislature. The na-
tive Alaskan villages contended that the statute -at issue allowed
abrogation of state sovereign immunity, thus permitting the vil-
lages to sue a state under the statute.6 9 Although the Court could
83 Id at 158.
The Supreme Court has used this canon many times, including in Cannon, 441 US at
698-99; Molzof v United States, 112 S Ct 711, 715-16 (1992); Franklin v Gwinnett County
Public Schools, 112 S Ct 1028, 1035-37 (1992). See also John Paul Stevens, The Shake-
speare Canon of Statutory Construction, 104 U Pa L Rev 1373, 1379-81 (1992).
" Molzof, 112 S Ct at 716.
88 See, for example, Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak, 111 S Ct 2578, 2585-86
(1991).
87 See, for example, Molzof, 112 S Ct at 715 (looking to legal dictionaries from period of
enactment to determine what the term "punitive damages" meant at the time).
68 111 S Ct 2578 (1991).
" Blatchford involved a jurisdiction statute that granted native Alaskan tribes access
to the federal courts. The native tribes in Blatchford sought to sue the State of Alaska
under the statute. The state claimed that the Eleventh Amendment, which grants sovereign
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have decided the case simply by applying a current test requiring a
"clear statement" of legislative intent,70 the Court instead ex-
amined the context of the statute's enactment to determine
whether Congress relied on a similar or less stringent Supreme
Court test. The Court reasoned that even if the enacting Congress
intended to permit abrogation of state sovereign immunity, it
would not have written a clear statement of that intent into the
statute unless the Supreme Court at the time of enactment re-
quired such a statement.7 1 Finding no Supreme Court opinion from
the time of the statute's enactment requiring one, the Court re-
sorted to the clear statement test to resolve the case.7 2 Neverthe-
less, it is important to note that Justice Scalia carefully considered
the context of the statute's enactment, and in fact used the current
test only after determining that no test existed during the time of
the statute's enactment.
The Court's use of the context canon presumes congressional
awareness of Supreme Court decisions. In regard to this presump-
tion the Blatchford Court wrote, "[w]e shall assume for the sake of
argument (though we by no means accept) that Congress must be
presumed to have had ... [a relatively obscure decision] in mind
as the backdrop to all its legislation. '7 3 The Court accepted the
presumption while acknowledging that it appeared to be contrived.
In other cases using the context canon, the Court has also stated
its acceptance of this presumption of congressional awareness.7 4
For example, in Cannon v University of Chicago, the Court stated,
"[i]t is always appropriate to assume that our elected representa-
tives, like other citizens, know the law."7 5
3. The context canon and the ACAA.
Courts can legitimately use the context canon to analyze im-
plication issues under the ACAA. In the past, the Supreme Court
created and used a variety of tests to decide whether to imply a
immunity to the states, barred the suit. The villages claimed that the statute implicitly
abrogated state sovereign immunity on behalf of native tribes. Id at 2580-81.
70 The test current at the time of the Blatchford decision was Dellmuth v Muth, 491
US 223 (1989). See Blatchford, 111 S Ct at 2584-85.
71 111 S Ct at 2585.
72 Id at 2585-86.
73 Id at 2585.
"' See Molzof, 112 S Ct at 716, citing Morissette v United States, 342 US 246 (1952);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Curran, 456 US 353, 379 (1982), citing Can-
non, 441 US at 696-97.
711 441 US at 696-97.
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private cause of action and corresponding damages under federal
statutes.76 The context canon can help courts determine which par-
ticular test constituted the backdrop for the enactment of the
ACAA.
Courts using the context canon must maintain the well-ac-
cepted presumption that the enacting Congress read and re-
sponded to contemporaneous Supreme Court opinions." In regard
to the ACAA, the presumption that Congress knew about specific
implication cases accurately reflects reality. The enacting Congress
could hardly have ignored important changes and developments in
the method of federal statutory construction. 8 In addition, Con-
gress closely monitored the Court's decisions regarding federal civil
rights legislation. In fact, Congress enacted the ACAA itself in di-
rect response to the Supreme Court decision in Department of
Transportation v Paralyzed Veterans of America.7 9 Thus, with re-
spect to the ACAA, the context canon accurately describes con-
gressional behavior and patterns of communication with the fed-
eral judiciary.
III. THE CONTEXT OF ENACTMENT AND IMPLICATION OF A PRIVATE
CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE AIR CARRIERS ACCESS ACT
Because neither the statutory language nor the legislative his-
tory of the ACAA explicitly indicates legislative intent,80 this Sec-
tion relies on the context canon of construction to determine
whether a private cause of action is available under the ACAA. In
order to ascertain the appropriate implication test for the ACAA,
this Section briefly recounts the recent history of Supreme Court
decisions establishing, applying, and overruling implication tests.
This Section also discusses Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v Lewis,81 which provides the appropriate test for interpreting the
ACAA, and applies it to the ACAA to determine whether private
76 See cases cited in note 19.
7 See notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
78 Indeed, in the four years following the Court's decision in Cort v Ash, the federal
courts implied a private cause of action under at least twenty federal statutes. See Cannon,
441 US at 741 (Powell dissenting).
79 477 US 597 (1986). See 132 Cong Rec S 11784 (Aug 15, 1986)(statement of Senator
Dole); 132 Cong Rec S 9899 (Jul 30, 1986) (statement of Senator Dole); 132 Cong Rec H 7193
(Sep 18, 1986)(statement of Representative Mineta).
80 The ACAA contains no provision discussing private enforcement or available dam-
ages. See ACAA, 49 USC § 1374(c). Likewise, the legislative history contains no explicit
discussion of private enforcement. See the legislative history cited in notes 1, 79.
81 444 US 11 (1979).
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causes of action are available under the Act. The Transamerica
test requires a more rigorous examination of intent than the test
courts have used to interpret the ACAA.
A. The History of Implication Doctrine
At first glance, permitting a private cause of action under a
statute that does not explicitly provide for one may seem unwar-
ranted. However, during most of the twentieth century, the federal
courts have implied private causes of action under federal statutes.
Remarking on this tradition, the Court once wrote:
When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of ac-
tion to support their statutory rights, the far better course is
for it to specify as much when it creates those rights. But the
Court has long recognized that under certain limited circum-
stances the failure of Congress to do so is not inconsistent
with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to
the persons benefited by its legislation.2
1. The Cort test.
In Cort v Ash, the Court created a four-pronged test for deter-
mining legislative intent to provide a private cause of action. 3 A
court first must determine whether the language of the statute in-
dicates that Congress intended to grant a benefit to a particular
class of people.84 Second, a court must ask whether the legislative
history indicates intent either to create or to deny a private cause
of action. Since the legislative histories of statutes involved in im-
plication cases often lack explicit evidence of intent,8" the Cort test
allows a mute or ambiguous history to serve as affirmative evidence
of a legislative intent to create a private cause of action.86 Third, a
court must consider whether private enforcement would be consis-
tent with the underlying purpose of the statute in question.17 Fi-
nally, a court must examine whether the area of law the statute
governs is one traditionally relegated to the states. If it is, then a
82 Cannon, 441 US at 717.
8 422 US at 78.
84 Id at 78, 80-82.
See notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
6 Cort, 422 US at 78, 82-84.
87 Id at 78, 84.
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private cause of action based on federal law would be
inappropriate. 8
Soon after Cort, the Supreme Court discovered that this test
made the implication of private causes of action an alarmingly easy
task. Indeed, federal courts implied private causes of action under
no less than twenty separate federal statutes in just the first four
years following the decision.89 In Cannon v University of Chicago,
decided about four years after Cort, Justice Powell most accurately
described the shortcomings of the Cort test. He stated in dissent,
[t]he Cort analysis too easily may be used to deflect inquiry
away from the intent of Congress, and to permit a court in-
stead to substitute its own views as to the desirability of pri-
vate enforcement. Of the four factors mentioned in Cort, only
one refers expressly to legislative intent. The other three in-
vite independent judicial lawmaking.90
2. The Cort test overruled.
In 1979, a few months after the Cannon decision, the Court
effectively overruled use of the Cort test in Transamerica.91 The
Transamerica test consists of only two prongs. The first prong of
the Transamerica test seems to mirror the first prong of the Cort
test. Under both tests, the first prong directs courts to ask whether
the statute created a federal right in a particular class of people.9 2
In Cort, however, the Justices presumed that when Congress cre-
ated a federal right via statute, it also intended to create a private
cause of action to enforce that right. In contrast, the Transamerica
Court viewed the question of the creation of a federal statutory
right merely as the threshhold for the second prong: a more direct
investigation into legislative intent. Reiterating Justice Powell's
concern in Cannon,93 the Transamerica Court stated that
"whether Congress intended additionally that these [statutory]
88 Id at 78, 84-85.
" See Cannon, 441 US at 741 (Powell dissenting).
" Id at 740 (Powell dissenting). Justice Powell criticized each of the remaining prongs
in detail. Id.
'1 444 US 11. Transamerica did not explicitly overrule Cort, but subsequent decisions
indicate that the test was essentially overruled. See Thompson v Thompson, 484 US 174,
189 (1988) (Scalia concurring) ("It could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the
Cort v Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v Redington and Transamerica Mortgage Advi-
sors, Inc. v Lewis . . . .")(citations omitted).
92 Transamerica, 444 US at 17-18.
See note 90.
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provisions would be enforced through private litigation is a differ-
ent question" from the question whether a right exists.94 Thus, al-
though the language of Transamerica's first prong tracks Cort,
under Transamerica that prong is not dispositive.
The second prong of the Transamerica test requires a direct
inquiry into legislative intent. This differs from the second prong
of the Cort test, which only requires courts to examine the legisla-
tive history for indications of intent. Under Cort, a mute or ambig-
uous history can serve as a positive indication of legislative intent
to create a private cause of action. 5 In contrast, the Transamerica
test instructs courts to look beyond the legislative history for posi-
tive evidence of implicit intent in the language of the statute and
the circumstances of its enactment.9 6 The Transamerica Court also
expressly rejected Cort's third and fourth prongs that looked to the
underlying purpose of the statute and to state law. Thus, the
Transamerica test squarely addresses Justice Powell's concerns in
Cannon regarding the Cort test, because Transamerica focuses di-
rectly on legislative intent.
3. The ACAA's context of enactment.
In the early 1980s, the Court began once again to refer to the
Cort test in cases in which the Court had been asked to imply a
private cause of action. 7 However, the reappearance of Cort did
not signal the demise of the Transamerica test because the Court
relied on both tests in resolving implication issues.9 8 It is likely
that the Court used the several prongs of the Cort test in these
opinions to add credence to the decision to create or deny a private
cause of action. Since the Cort test encompassed several prongs
related to general policy considerations, 9 the Court could call
upon those policy justifications to add support to any decision.
Yet, in 1985, before Congress enacted the ACAA, the Court
clearly rejected the Cort test in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v Russell.100 In Massachusetts Mutual, the lower court
91 444 US at 18.
96 See text accompanying notes 85-86.
9' 444 US at 18. This does not mean that courts should not look for explicit evidence of
intent in the legislative history. The test merely recognizes that such explicit information
will likely not exist.
97 See, for example, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v Transport Workers Union of America,
451 US 77, 90 (1981); California v Sierra Club, 451 US 287, 292 (1981).
' See Northwest Airlines, 451 US at 91; Sierra Club, 451 US at 293.
See notes 84.88 and accompanying text.
100 473 US 134 (1985).
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relied on the Cort test to imply a private cause of action. The Su-
preme Court explicitly rejected use of the Cort test and instead
applied the Transamerica test. The Court stated that "unless []
congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the stat-
ute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential
predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not ex-
ist."'10 1 Thus, while the Court was not troubled in the past by refer-
ences to Cort, it summarily rejected reliance on Cort alone. In-
stead, the Court made it clear that, the Cort test notwithstanding,
the ultimate question in implication cases rested on the type of
implicit intent the Transamerica test revealed. Thus, according to
the context canon of construction, the standard the Court applied
during the period of the ACAA's enactment-that is, the Tran-
samerica test as applied in Massachusetts Mutual-should be
used to determine implicit intent in the ACAA. 10'
B. The Transamerica Test
The Transamerica test starts with the threshold question
whether Congress enacted the statute for the benefit of a particu-
lar class of people. 103 However, its central feature is a direct in-
quiry into implicit legislative intent. 04 This direct inquiry includes
an examination of the language of the statute and of the circum-
stances of its enactment 0 5
1. Statutory language.
In Transamerica, the Court interpreted Sections 215 and 206
of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.106 In § 215, Congress de-
101 Id at 145, quoting Northwest Airlines, 451 US at 94.
102 In 1988, the Court again referred to the Cort decision in an implication case.
Thompson v Thompson, 484 US 174, 179 (1988). Because the Court reintroduced the Cort
test in this manner, current courts cannot be certain whether that test is valid or not. How-
ever, a court applying the context canon does not necessarily face this dilemma. For exam-
ple, as the history of implication doctrine makes clear, the Transamerica test was the cur-
rent test when Congress enacted the ACAA in 1986. Thus, courts interpreting the ACAA
should apply the Transamerica test to determine whether a private cause of action and
corresponding damages are available under the Act.
103 Transamerica, 444 US at 17.
104 Id at 15-16.
100 Id at 18. In addition to these two factors, the Transamerica Court also considered
the structure of the statute. However, because intent evidence gleaned from the structure of
the statute can always be overcome by other evidence of intent, see id at 20-21, this evi-
dence is not dispositive with respect to the ACAA.
106 15 USC §§ 80b-15 and 80b-6 (1982).
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clared "void" those contracts created in violation of the Act. 107 In
analyzing that section, the Transamerica Court found that the
term "voidness" necessarily carried with it the private right to a
civil cause of action.108 The Court noted that, according to the
common law of contract, a right to rescind creates in one party to a
disputed contract a civil liability that the other party can enforce
through litigation.'09 Thus, the Court implied a private cause of
action under § 215 because that provision invoked terms that
within the legal culture suggest the existence of a private cause of
action. 10
2. Circumstances of enactment.
The Transamerica Court also examined the language of § 206
of the Investment Advisors Act, but found that the language alone
did not indicate a legislative intent to create a private cause of ac-
tion. The Court did not end its inquiry there, however, but in addi-
tion examined the circumstances of the statute's enactment for ev-
idence of the requisite implicit intent.' The Court looked to other
securities statutes that Congress had enacted prior to the statute
in question."2 The Court found that Congress had explicitly pro-
vided for private causes of action in each of the previously enacted
statutes." 3 Comparing Congress' treatment of those statutes with
the statute at issue, which did not explicitly provide for such an
action, the Court concluded that Congress would have explicitly
107 Section 215 still reads in part: "Every contract made in violation of any provision of
this subchapter... shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of
any such provision ... shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract
.... " 15 USC § 80b-15 (1988).
108 444 US at 18.
1o1 Id, citing Deckert v Independence Shares Corp., 311 US 282, 289 (1940); Samuel
Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1525 (Baker, Voorhis, 3d ed 1970). Further-
more, because an already existing body of law, the Securities Exchange Act, contained the
terms used in the Investment Advisors Act, the Transamerica Court reasoned that Congress
must have intended for the Court to interpret the statutory terms in a like manner. Tran-
samerica, 444 US at 18-19.
10 For a similar line of reasoning, see Molzof, 112 S Ct at 716, quoting Morissette, 342
US at 263 ("where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradi-
tion and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of
ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was
taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed").
... 444 US at 19-21.
112 Id at 20-21 n 10, citing the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
and the Investment Company Act of 1940.
1' 444 US at 20.
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provided for a private cause of action in the case at bar if it had
intended to do so.114
Of course, the Court's observations about the circumstances of
the Act's enactment might also be applied to § 215, where the
Court found an implicit private cause of action. The reasoning of
the Court, however, demonstrates that only one positive indication
of legislative intent is required.
C. The ACAA Under the Transamerica Test
This Section applies the Transamerica test to the ACAA and
concludes that a private cause of action exists within the Act. In
addition to the fact that Congress enacted the ACAA particularly
for the benefit of people with disabilities,115 both the language and
circumstances of enactment indicate an implicit intent to create
such an action.
1. Statutory language.
Like the terms of § 215 of the Investment Advisors Act in
Transamerica, the terms used in the ACAA carry with them cer-
tain implicit attributes, including the right to a private cause of
action. The terms of the Act afford private citizens protection from
"discrimination.""' 6 In an already existing body of constitutional
law, a similar right to protection from discrimination arises out of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 7 The Supreme Court has
allowed private parties to enforce the constitutional right to equal
protection through civil litigation." 8 Thus, just as the Transamer-
ica Court drew an analogy between the common law and the stat-
ute in question, courts interpreting the ACAA should draw a simi-
lar analogy between constitutional law and the ACAA. The analogy
to constitutional law suggests that the ACAA implies a private
cause of action because it invokes a concept-a ban on discrimina-
114 Id at 21.
"I See Tallarico, 881 F2d at 569. Under Transamerica, a court interpreting a federal
statute should also ask the threshold question, whether Congress enacted the statute for the
benefit of a particular class of people of which the plaintiff is a member. It is clear from the
Act's face that it was enacted for the benefit of people with disabilities. The Act reads: "[n]o
air carrier may discriminate against any otherwise qualified handicapped individual, by
reason of such handicap ...." 49 USC § 1374(c)(1) (emphasis added).
"~ 49 USC § 1374(c)(1).
117 See Ronald D. Rotunda, John E. Nowak, and J. Nelson Young, 2 Treatise on Con-
stitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 14.7 at 23-23 (West, 1986).
"' See Davis v Passman, 44 US 228 (1979) (addressing Fifth Amendment equal
protection).
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tion-that implies within the legal culture the existence of a pri-
vate cause of action.
2. Circumstances of enactment.
The circumstances in which Congress enacted the ACAA also
suggest an intent to create a private cause of action. Again, the
circumstances of enactment include the backdrop of congressional
decisionmaking, as evidenced by other statutes governing the same
area of law as the statute in question." 9 The ACAA is a civil rights
law.120 Of the modern civil rights laws' 2' in force in 1986, the year
the ACAA was enacted, nearly half (including Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,122 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,123 and Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972124) were silent on the
issue of private causes of action. Just as many, including the Fair
Housing Act,125 and Titles 11126 and VII127 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, specifically provided for such actions.128 This fact alone
might suggest that Congress intended to allow for private enforce-
ment only in cases in which it had explicitly so provided. After all,
it appears that Congress knew how to create a private cause of ac-
tion if it chose to do so in the context of civil rights legislation.
However, by 1986, the federal courts had implied private
causes of action under every contested civil rights statute that did
not explicitly address the issue of enforcement. 129 Under the Tran-
See notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
110 "This legislation, [Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, is] often referred to as the
civil rights charter for individuals with disabilities.... I strongly believe that this major gap
in the protection that Section 504 affords . . . should be filled [by the passage of the
ACAA]." 132 Cong Rec S 9901 (Jul 30, 1986)(statement of Senator Cranston)(emphasis
added).
" Modern civil right statutes (those enacted after 1964) are similar to the ACAA, not
only because they were enacted within the same historical time period, but also because
they govern the actions of private individuals rather than states or state actors. Theodore
Eisenberg, Civil Rights Legislation: Cases and Materials 6 (Michie, 2d ed 1987).
222 42 USC §§ 2000d et seq (1988).
"2 29 USC §§ 701 et seq (1988).
124 20 USC §§ 1681 et seq (1988).
42 USC §§ 3601 et seq (1988).
116 42 USC §§ 2000a et seq (1988).
" 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (1988).
128 Fair Housing Act, 42 USC § 3613; Title II, 42 USC § 2000a-3; Title VII, 42 USC
§ 2000e-5.
"' See, for example, Cannon, 441 US at 694-703 (discussing Titles VI and IX of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Note, Safeguarding Equality for the Handicapped: Compensa-
tory Relief Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 1986 Duke L J 197, 197 n 6
("Courts of appeals in ten circuits have held that section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act]
implicitly confers a private right of action.").
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samerica test, this state of affairs indicates that the backdrop of
congressional decisionmaking in 1986 included the presumption
that courts would construe civil rights statutes to allow for private
enforcement in the face of legislative silence.' Given this inter-
pretive background, it is likely that Congress would have explicitly
denied a private cause of action in the language of the ACAA if it
had so intended. Thus, given the circumstances of its enactment,
the courts should construe the ACAA's silence regarding a private
cause of action as a legislative intention to provide for such an
action.
In addition, the circumstances of the ACAA's enactment indi-
cate that Congress enacted the statute even though it knew that
public enforcement procedures would not be put in place within
the statutorily mandated time period. The legislative history in-
cludes a copy of a letter from the Department of Transportation
that informed Congress that the Department might not be able to
"issue final new or revised regulations within the 120-day deadline
established by the bill."''1 In fact, the DOT did not issue regula-
tions until 1990, nearly four years after the ACAA's enactment. 32
Unless Congress anticipated some form of private enforcement, the
passage of the Act without prompt public enforcement would have
rendered the entire Act impotent. The passage of an unenforceable
Act would have been particularly unacceptable to the Congress in
this case. Because of the need to accommodate the disabled, Con-
gress reacted uncharacteristically swiftly and decisively when it
passed the ACAA. The legislation was a bipartisan effort that Con-
gress enacted within one hundred days from the date it was intro-
duced. 3 Much of the debate in the Senate focused on the Sena-
tors' desire to guarantee the disabled equal access to air
transportation as quickly as possible. 34 The juxtaposition of Con-
13 Although this presumption contradicts the usual presumption in implication cases,
see text accompanying note 52, one commentator has noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's
general hostility to the creation of implied rights of action finds a conspicuous exception in
the civil rights laws." Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 183 (cited in note 59).
132 Cong Rec S 11785-86 (Aug 15, 1986).
132 See 14 CFR Part 382 (1992).
See 132 Cong Rec S 19899-900 (Jul 30, 1986) (introduction of the ACAA in the
Senate); 132 Cong Rec S 11787 (Aug 15, 1986) (passage of the ACAA by the Senate); 132
Cong Rec H 7195 (Sep 18, 1986) (passage of the ACAA by the House).
134 See, for example, 132 Cong Rec S 11787 (Aug 15, 1986)(statement of Senator Met-
zenbaum) ("Over the years, the Department of Transportation has received numerous com-
plaints about discriminatory treatment of handicapped persons by different commercial air-
lines .... We have come a long way from the days when it was acceptable to treat persons
with disabilities as second class citizens. Congress must act now to ensure that handicapped
1202 [59:1183
Air Carriers Access Act
gress's decisive action with the anticipated lack of immediate pub-
lic enforcement suggests that Congress expected the ACAA to be
enforced, at least in part, through private causes of action.
IV. THE CONTEXT CANON AND THE IMPLICATION OF AVAILABLE
DAMAGES
The courts interpreting the ACAA failed to use the context
canon of construction when considering the issue of available dam-
ages. In 1983, the Supreme Court decided Guardians Assn. v Civil
Service Comm'n, N.Y.C., 3 5 which concerned implication of availa-
ble damages in cases in which courts had already implied a private
cause of action. Because Guardians was still good law when Con-
gress enacted the ACAA in 1986, the courts construing the ACAA
should have relied on that opinion when deciding the issue of
available damages. 136
An analysis of the ACAA using the Guardians test indicates
that courts should make damages for emotional distress available
to private plaintiffs, but deny the availability of punitive damages
under the Act. This Section discusses the Guardians test and then
applies that test, first to the issue of damages for emotional dis-
tress and then to the issue of punitive damages. In addition, the
treatment of punitive damages includes an analysis outside of the
canon of context.
A. The Guardians Test
In Guardians, the Court explicitly stated that the issue of
damages in implication cases was "analytically distinct" from the
issue of whether an implicit private cause of action existed.137
Thus, although courts should use the Transamerica test to explore
the availability of both a private cause of action and damages, the
two analyses should proceed separately.
In describing the analytical framework courts should use to
determine available damages, the Guardians Court wrote: "[t]he
usual rule is that where legal rights have been invaded and a cause
persons are not subjected to humiliating and degrading regulations or practices by any com-
mercial air carrier or its personnel.").
463 US 582, 584 (1983).
136 Indeed, in a recent case in which the plaintiff sought monetary damages under Title
IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court, using the context canon of construc-
tion, followed the Guardians reasoning. Franklin v Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S
Ct 1028, 1035-36 (1992).
"3 463 US at 595, citing Davis, 442 US at 239.
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of action is available, a federal court may use any available remedy
to afford full relief. The general rule nevertheless yields where nec-
essary to carry out the intent of. Congress or to avoid frustrating
the purposes of the statute involved."1 8 Thus, under Guardians, a
court interpreting the ACAA should presume that plaintiffs are en-
titled to full -compensation for all harms suffered, including any
emotional distress that resulted from the airlines' discriminatory
behavior. The general presumption for full relief yields to a show-
ing of a contrary legislative intent or a frustration of purpose.
Thus, in the absence of such a showing, courts should grant full
relief.139
To determine what damages Congress intended to make avail-
able, the Guardians Court applied the Transamerica test, the then
current test for implicit intent.140 The Transamerica test was also
the current test when Congress enacted the ACAA in 1986. Thus,
courts should use that test when determining implicit intent with
regard to available damages under the Act. Notably, though, the
Transamerica test operates differently when one asks whether
damages are available, rather than whether an implied cause of ac-
tion exists, due to the Guardians presumption in favor of full re-
lief. When a court considers whether to imply a private cause of
action, it generally begins with the presumption that a private
cause of action does not exist. 41 In contrast, when a court consid-
ers whether to imply damages, it begins with the Guardians pre-
sumption that full relief is available. Thus, when a court inquires
into available damages, only an affirmative indication of an intent
to deny full relief can override the Guardians presumption of its
availability.
B. The Air Carriers Access Act and Damages for Emotional Dis-
tress Under Guardians
To determine whether Congress intended to contradict the
Guardians presumption for full relief by denying recovery of emo-
tional distress damages under the ACAA, courts should apply the
Transamerica test. Under the Transamerica test, the backdrop of
,congressional decisionmaking for the ACAA can be discerned by
"3 Id, citing Bell v Hood, 327 US 678, 684 .(1946).
139 25 CJS § 63 (1966); 22 Am Jur 2d § 259 (1988).
',o 463 US at 599-600.
141 See Thompson, 484 US at 190-91 (Scalia concurring). But see note 146.
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examining other similarly drafted civil rights statutes enacted prior
to the ACAA. 142
Similarly drafted statutes, namely those that in 1986 were si-
lent on the issue of private enforcement, include Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,143 Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1973,144 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1972.145 By 1986, courts
had not conclusively answered the question whether plaintiffs
could recover emotional distress damages under these statutes.4 6
The general confusion on this issue within the federal courts indi-
cates that by 1986, the courts had yet to agree upon the signifi-
cance of silence in civil rights statutes such as the ACAA with re-
gard to the availability of emotional distress damages. Therefore,
evidence from the context of enactment does not conclusively indi-
cate a congressional intent to deny recovery of such damages, and
thus does not rebut the Guardians presumption. Consequently,
courts should award full compensatory relief, including damages
for emotional distress, under the ACAA.
C. The Air Carriers Access Act and Punitive Damages Under
Guardians
1. The ACAA in context: silence on punitive damages.
The Guardians presumption that courts should grant full re-
lief does not include the presumption that punitive damages are
recoverable. Unlike damages for emotional distress, punitive dam-
ages do not constitute compensation for injuries. 47 Rather, courts
142 See notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
143 42 USC §§ 2000d et seq.
144 20 USC §§ 1681 et seq.
145 29 USC §§ 701 et seq.
146 See Eastman v Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 939 F2d 204, 206 (4th Cir 1991) (dis-
cussing the division of courts over the nature and extent of recoverable damages under both
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act).
Several courts have granted monetary damages under the Rehabilitation Act. See
Smith v Barton, 914 F2d 1330 (9th Cir 1990); Miener v State of Missouri, 673 F2d 969 (8th
Cir 1982). Others have denied the recovery of such damages. See Rhodes v Charter Hospi-
tal, 730 F Supp 1383 (S D Miss 1989); Shuttleworth v Broward County, 649 F Supp 35 (S D
Fla 1986); Longoria v Harris, 554 F Supp 102 (S D Tex 1982).
The courts are equally divided with regard to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See Pfeiffer v Marion Center Area School District, 917 F2d 779 (3d Cir 1990) (holding
compensatory damages available); Franklin v Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F2d 617
(l1th Cir 1990) (denying damages).
141 See Black's Law Dictionary 390 (West, 6th ed 1990); W. Page Keeton, ed, Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2 at 9 (West, 5th ed 1984).
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assess punitive damages to punish the defendant and to deter
others from acting in a similar manner.148
Because the Guardians presumption does not apply to puni-
tive damages, courts should look for some indication of legislative
intent to allow recovery of such damages. By applying the Tran-
samerica test in this context, courts can determine whether the
ACAA was intended to provide for punitive damages.
Transamerica directs courts to look for implicit intent in the
circumstances of enactment as evidenced by the terms of other
statutes enacted prior to the ACAA.149 Of the modern civil rights
statutes enacted prior to 1986 (including Titles II, VI, and VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,15° the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,'1'
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,152 and the Fair
Housing Act' 53) only the Fair Housing Act provides for the recov-
ery of punitive damages.1 54 In addition, in 1986, courts did not per-
mit recovery of punitive damages under statutes that were silent
on the issue. 55 Thus, the backdrop of congressional decisionmak-
ing in 1986 included the presumption that statutory silence indi-
cated an intent to deny the availability of punitive damages. The
silence of the ACAA on the issue of punitive damages therefore
must be construed as an indication of Congress's intent to deny
the recovery of such damages.
2. Out of the context canon: Other civil rights statutes.
Generally, courts construe federal statutes so that they do not
contradict other federal statutes regulating the same area of law. 56
The ACAA is a civil rights statute.157 An examination of the mod-
ern federal civil rights statutes enacted after 1986, including the
148 Black's Law Dictionary at 390 (cited in note 147); Keeton, ed, The Law of Torts § 2
at 9 (cited in note 147).
149 See text accompanying notes 95-96.
150 Title II, 42 USC §§ 2000a et seq; Title VI, 42 USC §§ 2000d et seq; Title VII 42 USC
§§ 2000e et seq.
... 29 USC §9 701 et seq.
... 20 USC §9 1681 et seq.
153 42 USC §§ 3601 et seq.
42 USC § 3613(c)(1).
Using Title VII as an example, see James D. Ghiardi and John J. Kircher, 2 Puni-
tive Damages Law and Practice § 15.27 at 50 (Callaghan, 4th ed 1985).
I" While recognizing that Congress "does not, of course, merely enact general policies,"
the Court has decided to enforce legislative policies. Miles v Apex Marine Corp., 111 S Ct
317, 321 (1990), quoting Moragne v States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 US 375, 392 (1970).
157 See note 120 and accompanying text.
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Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 15s8 reveals a consistent
policy to deny the recovery of punitive damages under civil rights
legislation. 159 This policy first took shape in 1964 with the enact-
ment of Titles II, VI, and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,160
and has survived through the present day with the enactment of
the ADA.1 " In fact, punitive damages are only explicitly available
under the Fair Housing Act 6 2 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.163
The ACAA, however, does not contain any provision that explicitly
grants the right to recover punitive damages. A court granting pu-
nitive damages under the ACAA would directly contradict the ten-
ets of a well-developed body of statutory law. Denying recovery of
punitive damages under the ACAA represents the most consistent
and clear reading of the statute.
CONCLUSION
This Comment uses a canon of statutory construction to inter-
pret the ACAA and to determine whether a private cause of action,
damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages are available
under the Act. Courts should use the canon set forth in this Com-
ment when addressing implication issues, both in the context of
the ACAA and in the context of other federal statutes. When the
appropriate canon is used to interpret the ACAA, it becomes clear
that a private cause of action and emotional distress damages are
implicitly embodied in the Act, while punitive damages are not.
Courts using the appropriate canon to interpret other federal stat-
utes can decide important questions concerning the scope of such
statutes without requiring explicit new legislation to clarify im-
plicit directives.
158 42 USCA § 12188(b) (West, 1992 Pamphlet).
" Punitive damages have been awarded under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and
1871. Linda L. Schuleter and Kenneth R. Redden, 2 Punitive Damages § 19.3(D) at 342
(Michie, 2d ed 1989). However, under the modern civil rights statutes (those enacted from
1964 through the present), punitive damages have only been available when explicitly
granted by Congress or when sought in conjunction with a claim brought under Civil War
era statutes. See in regard to Title VII, Ghiardi and Kircher, 2 Punitive Damages § 15.27 at
26 (1991 Supp) (cited in note 155); Keller v Prince George's County, 827 F2d 952, 955 (4th
Cir 1987). Title VII illustrates this point particularly well because it is the most frequently
litigated civil rights statute.
o 42 USC §§ 2000a et seq; 42 USC §§ 2000d et seq; 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq,
respectively.
61 42 USCA §§ 12188(b).
42 USC § 3613(c).
42 USCA § 1981a(b).
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